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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Authority for this appeal is found within the confines 
of Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 12 and Section 78-
2a-3. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
United States Constitution Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14> Utah State Constitution; 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This is a criminal action wherein the defendant plead 
guilty to crimes of possession of narcotics and 
paraphernalia, yet reserving his right to appeal on the issue 
of the denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant 
sought the trial court to suppress evidence arguing that his 
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution were violated. The 
trial court denied his motion and the defendant seeks appeal. 
The officers conducted a search of a particular 
apartment under authority of a search warrant. The warrant 
was particular as to the apartment to be searched, the 
persons to be searched and the property to be searched. The 
defendant was not within any of said descriptions. He was 
outside the apartment repairing a truck. The truck was 
located within a common area utilized by the occupants of the 
apartment as well as residents of the apartments surrounding 
the common area. The officers approached the apartment and 
forcibly took the defendant to the ground, detained him and 
then required that he enter the apartment. He was later 
searched. Were the defendant's rights to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures violated? 
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STATBHEWT OF TEE CASE 
Defendant Stacey A. Covington was charged by information 
with possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence uncovered during the 
search of the defendant's person. The trial court denied 
said motion to suppress. The defendant entered a conditional 
plea reserving his rights to appeal the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
A Motion to Suppress hearing occurred before the 
District Court on June 22, 1994, pursuant to defendant's 
1 
Motion to Suppress. T-187,L7-12. Defendant•s motion was 
denied. The defendant thereafter entered a plea of guilty 
reserving this issue- The issue is dispositive of the case. 
The defendant challenged the propriety of searching the 
defendant when he was outside the home to be searched and was 
not named in the warrant. No authority existed under the 
warrant to search him. 
The State called Officer Shaun Adamson as a witness. 
Mr. Adamson is a deputy for the Utah County Sheriffs 
Department, assigned to work for the narcotics task force in 
Utah County. Officer Adamson testified that the Utah County 
Narcotic Task Force conducted a search upon the home located 
at 479 South 100 East in Pleasant Grove, Utah, pursuant to a 
search warrant. T-187, L-13,17. 
The narcotics task force offices were located only 200-
300 feet from the northeast corner of the residence. T-189, 
L-35. Pursuant to surveillance being maintained on the 
residence, (T-188, L-17-22) officers knew that the defendant 
did not live at the residence. T-189, L-14,15/T-191, L, 4-
10. Mr. Covington had not been at the home previously. T-
191, L 14-15. During the pre-raid plan, officers became 
aware that Covington was present (T-192, L 3-6) working on a 
vehicle 8-10 feet outside the residences. The truck had its 
hood up. T-193, L6-12. Covington was located between the 
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residence and the vehicle. T-193, L-19. Other apartments 
were within feet of the apartment to be searched, Mr. 
Covington, and the truck. T-201 L-17-24. 
Executing the warrant, the officers approached the 
southeast corner of the home. Uniformed officers entered the 
home first. T-194, L-l-11. The first contact was with Mr. 
Covington. Officer Adamson took custody of Mr. Covington; 
the other officer continued into the residence. T-194, L-17-
23. Only fractions of seconds elapsed between the time the 
initial officers approached Mr. Covington, and Adamson took 
him into custody. T-195, L-l-2. Covington was taken into 
custody; he was forced to the ground as the officers 
proceeded into the apartment. T-195, L-8-10. Covington was 
laid on the ground spread eagle near the front end of the 
truck. T-196, L-5-10. T-196, L-13. Other support units 
arrived and entered into the apartment; the apartment was 
secured. T-196, L16-17. Mr. Covington was frisked while on 
the ground. T-196, L-20-22. 
During the frisking of Mr. Covington, Adamson believed 
that he felt a hard object, cylinder in shape in Mr. 
Covington's shirt pocket. Adamson knew it was not a weapon. 
T-204 L-22-23. T-196, L- 25. He also felt a cigarette 
package in the same pocket. T-197, L-3-5. The hard object 
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was cylinder in shape; like a spark plug, but smaller in 
nature. T-197, L8-12. 
No further search occurred of Covington outside. It was 
only after Mr. Covington was taken inside the residence, down 
into the living room and was placed there with the 
apartment's residents that a search occurred. T-198, L-23--
T-199, L-3. Then the hard object was removed along with the 
cigarette package. Inside the cigarette package marijuana 
was discovered. The hard object was a marijuana pipe. T-199, 
L 9-12. 
Officer Adamson was aware that the search warrant 
authorized the search of the downstairs apartment and all 
individuals present at 47 9 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. He was aware that the search warrant directed a search 
of Rick Close, John Walker, Melissa Seamster, and narcotics 
or other evidence of trafficking. T-200, L-l-14. Officer 
Adamson knew, in fact, that Mr. Covington was not John 
Walker, Rick Close, or Melissa Seamster. T-200, L-19-25. 
Officer Adamson knew that Mr. Covington was at least 8-10 
feet outside the residence. T-201, L- 2-4. Adamson also 
recognized that the search warrant authorized only a search 
of the downstairs apartment. T-201, L-7-9. T-201, L-14-16. 
Adamson recognized that the area in which Mr. Covington was 
located was common ground to both apartments or units. The 
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apartment was one of two within the same building. Other 
apartments and residences were also located around this 
common area. T-201, L-17-24. 
Officers had no concern that Covington threatened their 
safety. Mr. Covington was observed to have no weapons upon 
his person. T-201, L-8-10. Mr. Covington was wearing a T-
shirt# plaid flannel shirt with long sleeves open in front, 
Levi's and tennis shoes. T-202, L-12-14. No guns, knives, 
or any other weapons were visible upon Mr. Covington as 
officers approached. T-202, L-15-17. During the pat down 
search of Mr. Covington, Adamson did not sense that there 
were any weapons upon Mr. Covington. T-202, L-20-22. 
Adamson felt that Mr. Covington posed no danger to himself or 
the other officers as he was placed on the ground. T-202, L-
23--T-203, L-6. 
Covington, after the pat down search outside, was 
handcuffed and taken into the basement apartment. T-203, L-
9-11. No resistance was given by Mr. Covington. He complied 
with all of the officer's requests or orders. T-203, L-14. 
Mr. Covington never attempted to alarm the other occupants of 
the basement. T-203, L-15-17. Covington did not have 
sufficient time to warn the occupants of the apartment. As 
the officers approached Covington, they were simultaneously 
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entering the apartment. T-203, L-20-24. T-203, L-25--T-
204, L-3. 
There was a total of approximately 7-8 officers 
conducting the search. T-212, L-22-23. They all entered the 
house basically at the same time. T-212, L-24/T-213, L-l. 
After Covington was taken downstairs and searched, he was 
arrested on the marijuana charge and transported to the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department. T-217 L- 24/T-218. In the 
process of booking, a small additional quantity of 
methamphetamine was found on his person. They located the 
methamphetamine in the change pocket of his Levi pants. T-
17, L-l-13. 
STOttAEY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The protection granted by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article l, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution which is often not grasped by zealous 
officers, does not deny law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. 
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime. When officers exceed the 
authority of a search warrant, it must be under only the most 
exigent circumstances. Here, the officer's safety was not 
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endangered nor was there any reasonable articuable suspicion 
that Covington was involved in criminal activity. 
hMSQMSST. 
MEMORANDUM OF IAW 
The Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing 
a search warrant strictly within the bounds set out by the 
warrant. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388, 
394 (1971); Standord v. Texas. 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); 
Marrnn v. U.S. 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). Particularity is 
demanded by the Fourth Amendment, and not read with poetic 
license. Commonwealth v. Hall. 366 Mass. 790, 323 N.E.2d 319, 
325 (1975); U.S. v. Medina. 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Once legally on the premises, lawful searches of fixed 
premises generally extend to the entire area in which 
contraband could reasonably be found. Containers may be 
searched, (United States v. Gray. 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 
1987); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987); S_£a£e. 
v. Jackson. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (April 19, 1994)), however, 
a distinction is made between visitors to the home and 
containers. Visitors cannot be searched. Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692,(1981); Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325 
(1990); State V. JacKson, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (April 19, 
1994) . 
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SEARCHES OF PERSONS PRESENT 
A distinction must be drawn between the home's residents 
and visitors. An individual's mere presence at a place named 
in a search warrant does not automatically subject the 
individual to a personal search. United states v. Pi Re. 332 
U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 225 (1948); Ybarra v. Illinois. 
444 U.S. 90, 92 (1979). Searches of items known to belong to 
visitors rather than to residents of the premises may result 
in personal searches, outside the scope of the premises 
search warrant. United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
in Michigan vt Summers/ the U.S. Supreme court 
legitimized the detention of the "occupant" of the searched 
premises. However, in Ybarra Vt Illinois, 444 U.S. 90, 92 
(197 9), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the search of 
a bar patron -- and the concomitant search and seizure of the 
property in his pocket - - where the search was based entirely 
on the mere fact of his presence at the bar. In Ybarra. the 
police executing a search warrant for a public tavern 
detained and searched all the customers who happened to be 
present. 
The upshot of Summers and Ybarra is that the police may 
briefly detain -- but not search -- the occupants of searched 
premises based entirely on their presence at the scene. 
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This is further verified by the holdings in State v. 
Jackson. 87 3 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994) wherein the Appellate 
Court held that it may be okay to search a visitor's purse 
(depending on its location) but not the visitor. 
OCCUPANT OR NON- OCCUPANT 
The Michigan v. Summers Court did not define what 
"occupant" meant. The Court did, however, make clear that it 
found it significant the fact that the executing officers 
knew that the individual detained 'lived in the house.' Id. 
at 692 n. 4 which draws into question -- what about a non-
occupant located outside the home? 
Lower courts have interpreted the "occupant" requirement 
broadly, not requiring ownership of the premises before 
detention is permissible (U.S. v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 7 01, 7 07 
(9th Cir. 1983)), but narrowly enough so as to preclude the 
detention of known non-occupants, i.e., visitors or guests, 
who are merely found to be present at the scene, state v. 
Carrasco. 711 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
Covington obviously is a non-occupant found outside the 
apartment• 
In Carrasco. the Court found that although the 
defendant had walked into the apartment without knocking, his 
conduct was otherwise not consistent with that of an 
'occupier' of the place and a search was impermissible. 
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Also, Martin v. State. 761 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1988); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720-721 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1984); State v. Braodhax, 754 P.2d 96, 103-104 (Wash. 
1982) . Searches are unlawful of persons who knocked on the 
door of a searched premises. U.S. v. clay, 640 F.2d 157 (8th 
Cir. 1981). Knight v. State, 566 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990). At any particular time, even a private residence 
may have on its premises any combination of residents, 
invitees, licensees, or even trespassers; any number of these 
occupants may be innocent of any alleged wrongdoing for which 
probable cause to search exists. Aguilar v. state, 594 A.2d 
1167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). Searches of persons leaving 
a premises as executing officers arrived was not justified. 
State v. Simien, 590 So.2d 603 (La. Ct. App 1992); A search 
of a person who entered and departed a search premises while 
officers were waiting for a warrant to arrive was 
unjustified. People v. Coscarelli. 493 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992). A search of an occupant was not justified by his 
mere presence at a drug sale. Rivera v. U.S.. 928 F.2d 592 
(2nd Cir. 1991). The assumption that anyone on the premises 
could be involved in drug trafficking would not be sufficient 
to justify full scale searches of those present. A person 
may visit a suspected premises for valid reasons. Bell v. 
State, 845 S.W.2d 4545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). Searches of 
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guests are impermissible. People v. Simmons. 569 N.E.2d 591 
(111. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Even a search of the owner and 
occupant of a searched premises has been held not permissible 
by the mere mention of his name in the search warrant as the 
owner. commonwealth v. Eicfcelfrerger, 508 A.2d 589 (Pa. sup. 
Ct. 1986). 
Other courts have found that even though a purse or 
container of a visitor may be searched dependent upon the 
particular circumstances, the person may not be searched. 
United States v. Teller. 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.) cert, 
denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 299 (1968); U.S. v. Johnson. 
475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Riccitelli. 
259 F.Supp. 665, 666 (D. Conn. 1966); Carman v. State. 602 
P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979). 
In State v. Jackson, the Court authorized a search of a 
purse but not the visitor. The purse was lying on a kitchen 
counter and the defendant was standing in the kitchen. Upon 
searching the purse, the officer saw a plastic bag containing 
marijuana and then found items identifying the defendant as 
the purse owner. The search of the visitor is impermissible. 
See also United States v. Brandt. 545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C. 
Cir. 197 6), wherein the Court found that neither the 
defendant nor his bag, being a mere visitor, were subject to 
search. 
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One must also look to Illinois v. Ybarra. wherein the 
search of patrons of a bar were not specified in the warrant 
and thereby not subject to search. The Supreme Court struck 
down the search of the bar's patrons although the bar may 
have been searched. In State of Utah v. Steward. 806 P.2d 
213 (Utah App. 1991), the Court found the mere presence of 
the defendant in the area where the officers are to search, 
or even the appearance of what appears to be suspicious 
behavior, does not justify a detention. The officers must 
have such reasonable cause to believe that criminal activity 
is afoot. See also Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 
2637, 61 L.Ed. 357 (1979). 
CONCISION 
The protection granted by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution which is often not grasped by zealous 
officers, does not deny law enforcement of the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. 
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, not to be judged 
by officers engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime. Once a warrant has been issued, it is a 
stamp of judicial approval granting to the police definite 
instructions defining what and who is to be searched. The 
12 
officers have no authority to exceed the warrant's direction 
excepting exceptional circumstances. The Warrant Clause 
places a line at the point where the property or persons to 
be searched come under the exclusive dominion of police 
authority. 
Here, the magistrate found probable cause to search the 
apartment and particular people therein- The search of the 
defendant was not authorized by the warrant and he should 
have been free from such a search. He was repairing a truck. 
He posed no danger to the officers. He posed no danger as to 
the success or failure of the apartment's search. He 
exhibited no articuable reason to suspect that he was 
involved in any crime. He was in a common area shared by 
multiple apartments and residences. He had not been observed 
as an occupant or a visitor to the apartment to be searched. 
There is no reason to believe that he was involved with this 
apartment or with its occupants. 
Even a visitor inside the apartment is free from search 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. However, the officers conducted a search of 
the defendant finding him outside. 
Mr. Covington should have been free from police 
intervention, therefore, any evidence that was uncovered from 
13 
the defendant should have been suppressed. The trial court 
erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 13 day of _ , 1995. 
IXIM^ ING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing on this tj> day of 
T ^ j ^ 1995, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
236 North State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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Ruling from Court denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
STACEY COVINGTON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CASE NO. 941400228 
DATE: July 18, 1994 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed 
May 4, 1994. A hearing on this motion was held June 22, 1994. The Court, after carefully 
considering the memoranda of counsel, entertaining argument of counsel, and having been 
advised of the facts and law pertaining to this case, now enters the following: 
I. 
FACTS 
On February 22, 1994, officers of the Pleasant Grove police department arrested 
Rachel Anderson pursuant to warrant. When officers discovered methamphetamine on her 
person, Anderson said that she had stolen the drug from one Rick Close and that there was 
more of the drug at Mr. Close's residence. Officers knew of Mr. Close, having investigated 
and arrested him a number of times in the recent past. Moreover, Mr. Close's basement 
apartment was near the offices occupied at that time by the Narcotics Task Force (NET). 
Indeed, officers had observed the entrance to Mr. Close's apartment from their office window. 
Based upon Anderson's information, along with other information including their 
personal knowledge of Close, officers obtained a search warrant from the Honorable John C. 
Backlund of the Fourth Circuit Court. The warrant authorized "search of . . . [t]he downstairs 
apartment and the persons of all individuals present at 479 South 100 East . . . for the 
presence of Rick Close, John Walker and Melissa Seamster" (Co-defendants in this case) and 
drug-related evidence. Moreover, the warrant describes the building as Ma white frame 
building containing two apartments." The description of the apartment was based upon the 
officers1 personal acquaintance with the premises. However, the correct address of the 
building is 475. South 100 East and the building is white on three sides but blue on the side 
facing the street. 
At the time this search warrant was issued, there were active warrants for the arrest of 
the three named individuals. As stated in the supporting affidavit, officers believed that all 
three were then living in the apartment—a fact later confirmed during the execution of the 
warrant. Moreover, to prevent the destruction, loss or sale of the drug-related evidence 
believed to be in Close's apartment, officers applied for and obtained authorization for 
nighttime, no-knock entry, pursuant to U.C.A. 77-23-5(1). 
Pleasant Grove uniformed officers and NET officers executed the warrant at 8:40 p.m. 
on February 22, 1994. As they approached the only entrance to the apartment, on the east 
side of the building, officers observed Defendant Stacey Covington standing just outside the 
apartment door. Near the Defendant to the east was the front end of a pickup truck with its 
hood raised. NET officers recognized Defendant as a person associated with Rick Close and 
the others named in the warrant. Some of the officers approached the Defendant, restrained 
him, and conducted a frisk or Mpat down" search of his person. This pat down search resulted 
in the discovery of both a marijuana pipe and marijuana. * 
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Following this discovery, officers brought Defendant into jhe apartment and secured 
him along with the other Co-defendants, while they awaited transportation to the Pleasant 
Grove Police Department. Officers then found a small canister on the ground near the spot 
where the Defendant had been restrained. The canister proved to contain 7.3 grams of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. Officers also found a second container in the 
engine compartment of the truck, which appeared to have been thrown or tossed there. 
Within the container was a white powder non-controlled substance which officers believe to 
have been intended for mixture with the methamphetamine prior to sale. 
As with all arrestees, Defendant was searched again at the police department, at which 
time they found a small quantity of methamphetamine on the Defendant's person. Defendant 
was subsequently charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute 
in a Drug Free Zone (a First Degree Felony), Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in 
a Drug Free Zone (a Class A Misdemeanor), Illegal Drug Tax (a Third Degree Felony), and 
(Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone (a Class A 
Misdemeanor). 
n. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Whether certain errors in the address and description of the premises to be searched 
render warrant defective when officers were neither mistaken nor confused as to the 
location described. 
B. Whether Defendant, who was searched while standing just outside the only door to 
apartment, fell within the scope of warrant authorizing search of "apartment and the 
person of all individuals present." 
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C. Whether affidavit and request for search warrant gave reasonable cause to support 
issuance of warrant authorizing nighttime search under U.C.A. 77-23-5(1). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Description of the Premises 
The Defendant seeks to invalidate the search warrant based on inaccuracies in its 
identification and description of the targeted premises. The Court considers this an impotent 
ploy on the facts of this case. It is well-established that the purpose of the description of the 
premises is to enable the officers executing the warrant to locate the premises. Thus M[t]he 
description is sufficient if the officer executing the search warrant can with reasonable effort 
ascertain and identify the place to be searched." State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970 at 972 (Utah 
App. 1989) citing State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 at 1102-03 (Utah, 1985). 
In this case, NET officers were personally familiar with the residence, having observed 
Close, one of its residents, for some time. Moreover, affiant Officer Michael Blackhurst, and 
other NET officers were all present and participated in the execution of the warrant. None of 
the officers went to a wrong location. Neither did the officers rely upon address numbers to 
determine the correct house: the numbers did not appear anywhere on the building. 
Defendant does not dispute that the accurate parts of the description, coupled with the 
officers* actual acquaintance with the premises, neither left confusion as to the location of the 
premises nor resulted in a search of the wrong premises. The three persons named in the 
warrant were all in the apartment and were all arrested pursuant to warrant. The errors in 
description of the premises amount to nothing of legal consequence. 
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B. Scope of the Warrant 
The warrant in this case authorized the search of the "apartment and the person of all 
individuals present." Defendant argues that because he was standing outside, he was not 
"present" at the apartment at the time he was spotted and searched. However, "it has been 
generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of 
any buildings or vehicles within the 'curtilage' even though they are not specifically described 
in the warrant," State v. Basturo. 807 P.2d 162 (Kan. App. 1991, afTd. 821 P. 2d 327 (Kan. 
1991), see also United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir., 1990) (authorized 
search of premises included search of car inside curtilage). Accordingly, the issue here is 
whether, at the time of search, Defendant was within the curtilage of the premises. 
The curtilage of a home is "usually defined as a small piece of land, not necessarily 
enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for domestic 
purposes in the conduct of family affairs." (State v. Kender. 588 P.2d 447 at 449 (Haw. 
1979) (emphasis added)). A number of factors, as enumerated by the United States Supreme 
Court, should be considered in reaching a determination of the extent of the curtilage in any 
given case. These factors include (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the 
area has been fenced or enclosed; (3) the nature and uses of the area; and (4) what steps have 
been taken to protect the area from observation. United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294 (1977). 
In this case, Defendant was located at the time of search immediately east of the only 
entrance to the basement apartment. He was standing within ten feet of the house, between 
the apartment door and a nearby truck with its hood raised. Both the Defendant and the truck 
were well within a space that had the obvious appearance of a parking and yard area for 
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residents of the apartments- The area is bounded by trees and debris to the north and a dirt 
driveway to the south. 
Defendant would characterize the area to the east of the house as a common area for 
both the house mentioned in the warrant and the house immediately to the south. It is true 
that the driveway flows into a large dirt parking area that is shared by Mr. Close's apartment 
and the building or buildings to the south. (At the time of the arrest—February—the dirt was 
snow-packed.) However, the spot where the Defendant was first discovered and searched was 
so close to the back of the house and far enough away from the line of the driveway as to 
leave no room for doubt that he was associated with the house. In effect, the Defendant was 
"walled in" by the trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the truck with the raised hood 
to the east, and the apartment to the west. This small area, adjacent to the apartment, clearly 
fell within the curtilage. 
The scope of the warrant authorized a search for drugs which might be found on the 
person of anyone present, including the Defendant. Given Defendant's known association 
with persons who lived at the residence, coupled with his proximity to the apartment door, he 
was "present" at the apartment and consequently within the scope of the warrant. 
C. Nighttime Search 
Defendant relies on State v. Rowe (no citation given) to sustain the proposition that 
the supporting affidavit here did not furnish "reasonable cause" for authorizing a nighttime 
search. In Rowe. the court focused on U.C.A. 77-23-5(1), which states in pertinent part: 
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in the 
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
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believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which 
case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night. 
There are two reported decisions in the Rowe case. In State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 
(Utah App. 1991) (Rowe I herein), the Court of Appeals held invalid a nighttime search 
warrant supported by an affidavit containing only the pre-printed statutory language quoted 
above. The warrant was devoid of elaboration of any reasonable basis for its conclusion. In 
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah, 1992) fRowe II herein), the Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals. Rowe II did not disturb the decision that the bare conclusion in the 
affidavit, without elaboration or basis, could not support a nighttime search. It did, however, 
rule that nighttime search under such a warrant was not a fundamental violation of the 
Defendant's rights which would require suppression of the evidence. The Court observed: 
Where the alleged violation . . . is not 'fundamental1 suppression [sic] is 
required only where (1) there was 'prejudice1 in the sense that the search might 
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been 
followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the [r]ule. . . . It is only where the violation also implicates 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad faith or has 
substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate 
remedy. Rowe II at 429. 
The nighttime search warrant in the instant case is clearly appropriate under Rowe I. 
In any event, no allegation has been made which would justify the exclusion of any evidence 
under Rowe II. After establishing throughout his supporting affidavit that persons on the 
premises were likely in possession of and selling controlled substances, Officer Blackhurst, 
stated his experience concerning persons who sell small quantities of methamphetamine. 
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"Such persons will typically sell what they have as quickly as they can until they are out of 
inventory . . .". (Paragraph 13.) Officer Blackhurst had previously qualified himself in the 
affidavit as an expert on narcotics trafficking in the area. (Paragraph 1.) Moreover, 
Paragraph 14 establishes that officers had acted in good faith, upon receipt of critical evidence 
mentioned in the affidavit, to prepare and obtain a search warrant but that execution likely 
would be impossible before dark. His conclusion that evidence would be lost or destroyed if 
search were delayed rested upon reliable information indicating that small quantities of 
methamphetamine were being distributed at the apartment, (paragraphs 4, 8, and 12), coupled 
with his experience that small quantities would be sold as quickly as possible. This hardly 
resembles the recitation of statutory factors in a check-off form of the type proscribed by 
Rowe I 
But in any event, there is no evidence, indeed no allegation, that but for the nighttime 
authorization this search would not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive. There 
is no evidence of an intentional and deliberate disregard of the statute. On the contrary, there 
is evidence of a good faith attempt to balance the statutory concern for nighttime searches 
with the need promptly to obtain the suspected contraband and arrest the individuals known to 
be in the apartment. Hence, there is no basis for the application of Rowe FT to the instant 
case. There is, in sum, no reason to suppress the evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The search of the Defendant pursuant to a warrant which misstated the address of the 
premises to be searched and inaccurately described it as a white frame house was lawful, 
inasmuch as officers were not misled as to the correct location of the search. Moreover, the 
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Defendant's presence within the curtilage of the apartment connected him with the apartment 
so as to be "present" at the apartment and thus within the scope of a warrant authorizing a 
search of the apartment and the person of all individuals present. Finally, the affidavit in 
support of the warrant stated reasonable cause for the execution of a nighttime search and, in 
any event, Defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated as a result of a purportedly 
inadequate affidavit. 
V. RULING 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this day of #HW . 1994 
cc: James R. Taylor 
Shelden R. Carter 
BY THE COURT 
.Wage Lynn W. Davis 
